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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
In a year when attention focused upon the propriety of actions taken
in high places, local governments naturally came in for their share of
scrutiny. For both municipalities and counties, the pace was fervid.
Their actions were the actions of interest to courts, legislatures, and
people. This survey records the highlights of that preoccupation as it
was manifested in law-the law of local government.
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

A.

Power
The "power" focus of this survey period centered upon the municipal
effort to collect franchise fees from electric membership corporations.
That effort, in two distinctive contexts, proved notably unsuccessful.
Initially, the court of appeals, in City of Calhoun v. North Georgia
Electric Membership Corp.,' tracked an earlier treatment of the nature
of a "franchise":2 "[Mhis court held that a franchise is a contract
creating property rights, that a city could not create such a contractual
relationship by its unilateral act; and that in the absence of an
agreement between the parties, a city could not collect a franchise fee
from the EMC. 3 A municipal ordinance purporting to authorize the fee
counted for naught: "At every opportunity the EMC has rejected the
proposed franchise and has done nothing inconsistent with that

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.

Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer research support that contributed most significantly to
the preparation of this survey.
1. 209 Ga. App. 547, 433 S.E.2d 698 (1993), cert. granted.
2. Id. at 547,433 S.E.2d at 699 (citing City ofLaGrange v. Troup County EMC, 200 Ga.

App. 418, 408 S.E.2d 708 (1991)).
3. Id.
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position."4 The municipality was thus "not entitled to a franchise fee,"'
the court concluded, and "the trial court did not err in so finding.
The court's analysis in the second case, Athens-Clarke County v.
Walton Electric Membership Corp.,7 went to a markedly distinguishable,
and far more unique, issue. It derived from a city-county consolidated
government's attempt to impose franchise fees upon an EMC operating
only in the previously unincorporated county area.' In evaluating that
attempt, the court examined the nature of the governmental consolidation and viewed it to result in "a hybrid" of the former county and
municipality.9 The unified charter created "a new political entity,""0
but did not attempt to abolish the former county." The entity created,
the court asserted, "is not a municipality within the meaning of the
Territorial Act which is authorized to charge franchise fees." 2
B. Officers and Employees
The legal issues unfolding around municipal officers and employees
touched upon successive phases of a governmental career. At the
threshold, City of Atlanta v. Jackson" featured alleged illegality in
4. Id. at 548, 433 S.E.2d at 699. The court rejected the municipality's arguments
grounded in "contracts implied in fact or law," reasoning that "neither of th[olse theories
is applicable here." Id. As the court explained, "the EMC has not accepted services from
the City rendered under the purported franchise." Id.
5. Id. The court emphasized that the EMC had not extended its service into the
franchise area but, on the contrary, "the scope of the EMC's service in the city has
remained constant or has decreased." Id. Indeed, "the City has annexed areas in which
the EMC was already providing service." Id.
6. Id.
7. 211 Ga. App. 232, 439 S.E.2d 504 (1993), cert. granted.
8. Id. Before consolidation, "ta]s Walton EMC operated only in unincorporated Clarke
County, it paid no franchise fees to the City." Id. at 232-33, 439 S.E.2d at 505.
9. Id. at 234, 439 S.E.2d at 506. The consolidation resulted from the legislative
enactment of a charter, under authority of GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 2(a). The court
rejected the consolidated government's position that "as the new governmental entity is
both a municipality and a county, it is authorized to collect these fees as is any other
municipality." 211 Ga. App. at 234, 439 S.E.2d at 506.
10. Walton Electric, 211 Ga. App. at 234, 439 S.E.2d at 506.
11. Id. The court emphasized that "no portion of the Athens-Clarke County unified
charter was ambiguous as the continued existence of Clarke County as a political entity
was the intended result of the unified charter." Id.
12. Id. at 235, 439 S.E.2d at 507. The court's reference was to the Georgia Territorial
Electric Service Act. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-1 to -15 (1992). The court viewed any charter
provisions to the contrary to be "in conflict with provisions of the general law" and invalid
for that reason as well. 211 Ga. App. at 235, 439 S.E.2d at 507. Additionally, the court
noted its earlier decision in City of LaGrange (discussed above) as authority for no
franchise fees "in the absence of an agreement to do so." Id. at 235, 439 S.E.2d at 507.
13. 236 Ga. 426, 435 S.E.2d 212 (1993).
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obtaining the position itself. Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court
pondered, would the officer's alleged fraud in becoming municipal14
Aviation Commissioner affect calculation of his* pension benefits?
Responding in the negative, the court fastened upon what it perceived
as the "spirit" of the municipal code, a code explicitly ruling "reason for
termination" irrelevant to pension rights.'5 From that declaration, the
court reached the following conclusion: "A finding ... that an act of an
individual before becoming employed by the City exposes him to the risk
of forfeiting pension benefits, when an act taken while employed by the
City does not, would contradict the spirit and terms of the city code." l"
That conclusion found additional support in statutes establishing "a
standard for the
17 forfeiture of pension benefits based on an employee's
wrongful acts."
Concerned with the opposite pole on the employment spectrum, Martin
v. Laporte's confronted the court of appeals with termination and leave
of absence. 9 The court considered a municipal employee's appeal from
the civil service board's conversion of outright termination to a one-year
leave of absence without pay.2 0 Although the employee testified that
she was able to work during the period of the leave, the court found
"uncontradicted evidence that shortly before her termination she
repeatedly sought a leave of absence through a minister and her lawyer
and that the stress of her job was an important factor in her illness."2 '
Consequently, the court sustained the board's actions.22

14. Id. at 426, 435 S.E.2d at 213. The mayor had requested the pension fund board to
hear evidence that the officer, a former city councilman, had falsely denied having a
business relationship with airport concessionaires. The board rejected that request and
determined that the officer's pension should be based upon all his years of public service.

Id.
15. Id. at 427, 435 S.E.2d at 213-14. The court relied upon § 5-28 of the city code
stating that "the manner of an employee's termination shall not impair the employee's
right to a pension." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 427, 435 S.E.2d at 214. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. §§ 47-1-22 and 47-122.1 for the determination "that a public employee's pension benefits may be forfeited only
upon conviction of a public employment related crime committed in the capacity of a public
employee or upon conviction of a drug related crime." 263 Ga. at 427, 435 S.E.2d at 214.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the municipality's complaint. Id.
18. 211 Ga. App. 459, 439 S.E.2d 704 (1993).
19. Id. at 459, 439 S.E.2d at 705.
20. Id. The municipality had terminated the employee for reasons of "excessive
absenteeism," and "jobabandonment." Id. After hearing evidence, the civil service board
found the employee unable to perform her duties during the period of the imposed leave.
Id.,
21. Id. at 461, 439 S.E.2d at 706.
22. Id.
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Two contests of the survey period revolved around the employee's right
to workers' compensation benefits.2 The court characterized the record
in City of Marietta v. Kirby" as revealing that a longtime firefighter
sustained a work injury to his cervical spine in 1982, received workers'
compensation, returned to normal duties, and had suffered neck and
back pain more or less continuously since that time.26 On that record,
the court affirmed the compensation board's determination that the
employee's medical claims for an episode in 198926 fit the category of
"change in condition" rather than "new accident. 027 As such, the court
affirmed, the claims related back to the 1982 injury and remained the
responsibility of the municipality's then compensation carrier.28
The compensation claim failed in City of Atlanta v. Spearman,' an
action for injuries to an employee who fell in the parking lot on her way
to work.30 Emphasizing coverage to require that the employer own or
maintain the lot, the court carefully reviewed the evidence.3 ' That
evidence revealed that the municipality leased 100 spaces in the lot for
its employees, allotted those spaces to certain employees, and deducted
payment for the space from each employee's monthly check.3 2 The
municipality's allocation of spaces, the court held, did not amount to
"operating or controlling" the lot; and the accident, the court concluded,
thus did not "arise out of and in the course of' plaintiff's employment.'

23. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation in Georgia
Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
24. 210 Ga. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 762 (1993).
25. Id. at 566, 436 S.E.2d at 763.
26. Id. The claim was for medical payments and temporary total disability for a period
of several weeks. Id.
27. Id. The court refused to find a new accident in the fact that the employee may have
aggravated his condition by lifting a dog while fighting a fire; that, the court said, 'would
have been a normal work duty for [the employee]." Id at 569, 436 S.E.2d at 765.
28. Id. at 569, 436 S.E.2d at 765. The municipality had subsequently changed
insurance carriers and later shifted to a self-insured status. Id.
29. 209 Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993).
30. Id. at 644, 434 S.E.2d at 87.
31. Id. at 645, 434 S.E.2d at 88. Although injuries in a parking lot constitute an
exception to the rule that the employee is not covered for injuries while going and coming
from work, the lot must be owned or maintained by the employer. "Where the parking lot
is neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer, the lot is not part of the
employer's premises and the rationale which allows recovery of workers' compensation
benefits does not apply." Id.
32. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 87-88.
33. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 88. The court of appeals thus held that the board had
erroneously equated allocation of spaces with municipal control, and that the trial judge
had erred in finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of plaintiffs
"I
I
employment. Id.

19941
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C. Recall
Both state and local government officials operate under the historic
potentials of the recall proceeding."4 The supreme court plumbed those
potentials for municipal officials on two occasions during the period
under scrutiny.' Collins v. Morris projected as an issue of constitutionality the recall statute's provision for judicial approval.' Although
mandating approval of the recall application's grounds and factual
support, there could be no judicial hearing upon the truth or falsity of
those grounds.' That limitation, challengers maintained, operated to
deprive elected officials of due process. 39 The supreme court responded
with the observation that "recall is a concept which is predicated upon
the power of the electorate to remove its elected officials." 40 That
concept was served, the court reasoned, by "a statute which provides
that the electorate, rather than the judiciary, shall determine the
ultimate truth or falsity of the allegations of misconduct ....

."

The

court thus held the statute adequate in its provision of due process to
the public official.4'
As for the sufficiency of grounds and supporting facts, Davis v.
Shavers' featured a recall application which alleged acts of "'malfeas-

34. The Georgia Constitution expressly provides for the procedure, GA. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, para. 4, and the implementing statutes are found in O.C.GA. §§ 21-41 to -21 (1993).
35. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., RememberingRecall in Local Government
Law, 10 GA. L. REV. 883 (1976).
36. 263 Ga. 734, 438 S.E.2d 896 (1994). The case involved the attempted recall of the
members of a municipal council. Id. at 734-35, 438 S.E.2d at 896-97.
37. Id. at 735, 438 S.E.2d at 897.
38. O.C.G.A. § 21-4-6(f) (1993). The court described the statute as providing "that an
elected official is entitled to judicial review of the recall application to determine whether
a statutorily specified ground for recall has been indeed stated and whether the supporting
allegations of fact, if true, would authorize a finding that the statutorily specified ground
for recall exists." 263 Ga. at 736, 438 S.E.2d at 897-98.
39. 263 Ga. at 735, 438 S.E.2d at 897. Challengers charged the statute denies "an
elected official any meaningful opportunity for a hearing even when the evidence would
demonstrate that the alleged factual grounds for recall are completely fabricated." Id.
40. Id. at 737, 438 S.E.2d at 898. The court conceded that the elected official's
"property interest" in his office can be taken only by means of due process, but asserted
that "appellants took office subject to the condition that they could be recalled by the
electorate." Id. at 736, 438 S.E.2d at 897. Due process, the court explained, is "a flexible
concept." Id. at 737, 438 S.E.2d at 898.
41. Id. Justices Benham and Hunstein dissented from this determination. Id.
42. Id. The court also held that the trial judge's determination that the form of the
recall application was insufficient would not bar the filing of a revised application within
six months. Id. at 738, 438 S.E.2d at 899.
43. 263 Ga. 785, 439 S.E.2d 650 (1994).
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ance' and 'misconduct'" on the part of a municipal councilman."
Supporting facts included the councilman's illegal passage of an
amendment by resolution rather than by ordinance, his voting to pay
another councilman two years salary in advance, and his voting to give
the city manager a raise in a closed meeting which should have been
open.' Holding the trial judge's finding of insufficiency not "clearly
erroneous," the court reasoned as follows: Although the recall
advocates "maintain in their application that all three factual allegations
are violations of... the Code of Ethics for Government Service, 4 it is
only by reference to their brief that one gains notice of why these alleged
sets of facts may constitute acts of malfeasance or misconduct in
office."'

D. Regulation
Local government regulation of conduct must avoid undue encroachment upon constitutionally protected freedoms.49 The face-off is
particularly acute when it involves the freedoms of expression protected
by the First Amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court confronted that

44. Id. at 788, 439 S.E.2d at 652. The trial court had found the recall application
legally insufficient and enjoined the issuance of recall petition forms. Id. at 785, 439
S.E.2d at 650.
45. Id. at 786, 439 S.E.2d at 651.
46. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 652. The court emphasized that
it is imperative that the application state with clarity and specificity the facts
supporting the grounds for recall such that both the public and the official sought
to be recalled are properly notified of the violation alleged to have been committed.
This court has held that the standard of determining the "legal sufficiency," [1, of
a factual allegation, is whether it states "with reasonable particularity a ground
for recall."
Id. at 786-87,439 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting Hamlett v. Hubbard, 262 Ga. 279,416 S.E.2d 732,
733 (1992)).
47. O.C.GA. § 45-10-1 (1990).
48. 263 Ga. at 787, 439 S.E.2d at 652 (citations omitted). As for amending by
resolution rather than by ordinance and voting for advance salary, "there is nothing in the
application for recall from which the public may determine that the facts themselves, even
if taken as true, amount to acts of misconduct or malfeasance." Id. (citing Brooks v.
Branch, 262 Ga. 658, 424 S.E.2d 277 (1993)). As for the alleged closed meeting, "the public
was given notice of neither time nor place of the alleged violations such that verification
and an informed decision as to whether to sign the application for recall could be made."
Id.
49. For background on local government regulation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion
in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); Reasoning by Riddle: The
Power to Prohibitin GeorgiaLocal Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974); "Ascertainable Standards" versus "Unbridled Discretion" in Local Government Regulation, GA.
COUNTY GOVERNMENT MAGAZINE, Dec. 1989, at 19.
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face-off in resolving Gravely v. Bacon," a challenge to the validity of a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol at erotic dance
establishments. 1 The ordinance defined covered establishments as
featuring live performances emphasizing "specified sexual activities or
specified anatomical areas." 2 The challenge arose upon the municipality's denial of a liquor license to a nude dancing establishment.'
The court approached the controversy by acknowledging nude dancing
to be "protected expression,"' and sketching a three-pronged test for
balancing regulation and infringement." The challenger's attack, the
court asserted, engaged the third prong: "the incidental restriction of
speech [can be] no greater than is essential to further the government
interest."" With test in place, the court interpreted the ordinance "as
limited to adult dance entertainment businesses that studies have shown
produce undesirable secondary effects.""7 As narrowly construed, the
ordinance did not prohibit the live performance of plays, operas, or
ballets, nor private conduct or public entertainment not involving live
performances." Accordingly, the court concluded, "[the] ... ordinance's
incidental restriction on the protected expression of nude dancing at
adult dance establishments is no greater than is essential to protect the
government's interest in preventing unwanted secondary effects." 9

50. 263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993).
51. Id. at 203, 429 S.E.2d at 664.
52. Id. at 204, 429 S.E.2d at 664. The ordinance listed seven "specified sexual
activities," and defined "specified anatomical areas." Id. at 204-05, 429 S.E.2d at 664-65.
53. Id. at 203,429 S.E.2d at 664. Plaintiff challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional
and sought to enjoin its enforcement by the municipality. Id.
54. Id. at 205, 429 S.E.2d at 665.
55. Id. The court adopted the test from its opinion in Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982). The test focuses upon whether the regulation
furthers an important government interest, whether that interest is unrelated to
suppression of speech, and whether the regulation's incidental restriction of speech is no
greater than is essential to further the government interest. 263 Ga. at 205, 429 S.E.2d
at 665.
56. 263 Ga. at 205,429 S.E.2d at 665. The challenger did not dispute compliance with
the first two prongs. Id.
57. Id. at 206, 429 S.E.2d at 666. 'Me ordinance applies to topless or bottomless
dancers, go-go dancers, strippers or similar entertainers' whose public performance conveys
an erotic message distinguished by an emphasis on sexual activities or anatomical areas."
Id
58. Id.at 205, 429, S.E.2d at 665.
59. I& at 207, 429 S.E.2d at 666. "Therefore, it does not restrict protected expression
in violation of the federal or state free speech clauses." Id. The court also held the
ordinance not violative of equal protection. Id. Justice Sears-Collins dissented on grounds
that the ordinance violated protected expression. ld. at 208, 429 S.E.2d at 667.
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E. Property
In Bridges v. City of Moultrie,')the municipality's action for possession of real property, against a lessee of that property, bested two
defensive objections.61 First, the lessee could not dispute his landlord's
title, asserted the court of appeals, when the lessee was in possession
and recognizing the title he sought to dispute.' Second, the lessee's
claim of a railroad's (former owner) abandonment of the railway line was
not a proper defense to an action for possession of property upon which
the depot had been located." "The lease covers the parcel of land,
adjacent to the line on which the former depot is situated.'
Accordingly, the court affirmed a summary judgment for the municipality,
favoring issuance of a writ of possession."
F

Finances
Municipal public works projects carry several statutory strictures.
One of those strictures commands that the municipality obtain from the
project contractor a bond "in the manner and form" specified by the
statute." Failure to obtain the bond subjects the municipality to
liability to unpaid subcontractors on the project.6 7 Mayor of Savannah
v. Norman J. Bass Construction Co.' featured a subcontractor's action
under the statute against the municipality,"9 In defense, the municipality tendered the subcontractor's failure to comply with yet another
statute, one requiring nonresident contractors to register and file a bond
with the Revenue Commissioner." Violation of that statute precludes
"an action to recover payment for performance on the contract in the

60. 210 Ga. App. 697, 437 S.E.2d 368 (1993).
61. Id. at 698-99, 437 S.E.2d at 369-70. The municipality had acquired the real
property by quitclaim deed from a railroad as well as the assignment of a lease from the
railroad to the defendant. Thereafter, under the terms of the lease, the municipality

terminated the lease effective 30 days later. Id. at 698, 437 S.E.2d at 369.
62. Id. at 699, 437 S.E.2d at 370. The landlord's action for ejectment rested not upon
its legally enforceable title to the land, said the court, but rather upon a presently
enforceable lease contract with the tenant which the tenant had breached. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. This was true no matter what disposition was made of the railroad line itself
upon abandonment: "the railroad line is not the subject property." Id
65. Id.
66.

O.C.G-A. § 36-82-102 (1993).

67. Id.
68. 264 Ga. 16, 441 S.E.2d 63 (1994).
69. Id.at 16, 441 S.E.2d at 64.
70.

O.C.G.A. §§ 48-13-31 to -32 (1982).
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courts of this state."7 Confronted with this statutory standoff, the
supreme court rejected the subcontractor's contention that preclusion
went only to nonresident contractor actions "to recover payment for
performance under the contract."72 Rather, the court reasoned, the
statute "precludes any action in which the relief sought is the recovery
of payment for performance under the contract."73 By virtue of its
action under the statutory bond command, the court asserted, plaintiff
"seeks to recover payment due it for work it has performed under its
subcontract;" that it based municipal liability upon failure to obtain a
proper bond "is irrelevant. 4 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
judge's denial of a municipal motion to dismiss plaintiff's action.75
G.

Liability
Typically, the most litigated facet of municipal law during the survey
period was that of liability."6 In one fashion or another, plaintiffs
pressed assorted claims against municipalities for the alleged wrongs of
their agents. When those claims sounded in negligence, they risked the
bar of sovereign immunity unless (under the Georgia Constitution of
1983) that immunity had been waived by liability insurance.77 City of
Lawrenceville v. Macko,78 an action for periodic flooding of plaintiffs'
property, illustrated the point.79 Prior to any other element of the
negligence claim, the court of appeals emphasized, plaintiffs must

71.

Id. § 48-13-37.

72. 264 Ga. at 17, 441 S.E.2d at 65.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 18, 441 S.E.2d at 65.
75. Id. "For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's ruling that § 48-13-37 did not
apply to [plaintiff's] action against the City. On remand, the trial court will be free to
address [plaintiffs] contention that it was not a nonresident contractor." Id.
76. See generally R PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUMCIPAL TORT LIABLxY IN
GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability:
The "Crisis' Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1986); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
77. GA. CONST., art. I, § 2, para. 9. Actually, the provision covered the state and its
"departments and agencies," but the Georgia Supreme Court applied it to counties in
Toombs County v. O'Neal, 254 Ga. 390,330 S.E.2d 95 (1985), and to municipalities in Fiers
v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
78. 211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
79. Id. at 313, 439 S.E.2d at 98. Plaintiffs alleged municipal negligence in building
inspections and issuance of a building permit. Id. at 312, 439 S.E.2d at 97.
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affirmatively show a waiver of municipal immunity.s" Their "failure to
produce the insurance policy was fatal to their action for negligence.""1
In 1990, the people ratified an amendment to the Georgia Constitution
replacing the waiver provision and declaring the state and "its departments and agencies" immune from liability (despite insurance).8' That
amendment, the supreme court held in City of Thomaston v. Bridges,"
did not apply to municipalities." Accordingly, in Bridges, an action for
injuries resulting from plaintiff's collision with a police officer,s" the
court concluded that "the City has no immunity to the extent its liability
is covered by the purchase of liability insurance.'o
Aside from the immunity issue, municipal liability cases must also
meet general negligence requirements. One of those requirements,
"proximate cause," claimed controlling status in Mixon v. City of Warner

80. Id. at 314, 439 S.E.2d at 98. The court noted that sovereign immunity is not an
affirmative defense and that waiver must be established by the party seeking to benefit
from it. Id.
81. Id. "[lit is undisputed that [plaintiffs] failed to present any evidence showing the
City's affirmative waiver of its immunity from suit. The policy of insurance was not
presented at trial, and a determination of a waiver of immunity cannot be made if an
insurance policy has not been furnished." Id. (citing Hancock v. Dobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (11th
Cir. 1992)). The court thus reversed the trial court's judgment for plaintiffs. Id. at 317,
439 S.E.2d at 100.
82. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
83. 264 Ga. 4, 439 S.E.2d 906 (1994). The court said: 'The issue presented in this
appeal is whether Art. 1, § 2, 919 of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, as amended effective
January 1, 1991 ... precludes a waiver of sovereign immunity by a municipality through
the purchase of liability insurance." 264 Ga. at 4, 439 S.E.2d at 907 (footnote omitted).
The court expressly did not address the amendments applicability to counties. Id. at 4 n.1,
439 S.E.2d at 907 n.1.
84. 264 Ga. at 7, 439 S.E.2d at 909.
Accordingly, although in Hiers we construed the language in former Art. 1, § 2, 1
9 to include municipalities, we cannot allow that construction, which effectuated
the intent behind the 1983 provision, to bind this Court to a construction which
directly conflicts with the obvious intent of the drafters of the 1991 amendment
and contravenes the cardinal rule of construction ....
Accordingly, we cannot
agree with the City that we are constrained to hold that "state and its departments and agencies," as interpreted in the 1983 prevision in Hiers, includes
municipalities, as used in the 1991 amendment. Instead, we conclude that
municipalities do not come within the ambit of the 1991 amendment.
264 Ga. at 6-7, 439 S.E.2d at 909 (footnote omitted).
Justice Carley, joined by Presiding Justice Hunt and Justice Fletcher, concurred
specially, on the ground that the court's decision in Hiers itself had been wrong. Id. at 7-9,
439 S.E.2d at 909-11.
85. Id. at 4, 439 S.E.2d at 907. The accident occurred while the police officer was
responding to an emergency call. Id.
86. Id. This was the finding of the trial court, the finding affirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 7, 439 S.E.2d at 909.
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Robins, 7 an action for the death of a motorist strdck by a suspect
fleeing a police officer." Scoring the recurring nature of the instance,
the court of appeals sought "to articulate for the first time in Georgia a
general rule to guide the trial courts in their consideration of these
cases." 9 Explicitly balancing "public policy interests,"' the court
elaborated the rule:
We hold that when a police officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, and
the suspect injures a third party as a result of the chase, the officer's
pursuit is not the proximate cause nor is it a contributing proximate
cause of those injuries unless the plaintiff can show that the conduct
of the police officer, either in initiating or continuing the pursuit, was
such that it posed a higher threat to public safety than is ordinarily
incident to high-speed police pursuits.91
The court held that the pursuit in Mixon, lasting less than one minute
and only until the officer could radio the suspect's license number, failed
to yield liability.9
A close common law companion of "proximate cause," the element of
"duty" dominated City of Lawrenceville v. Macko.9" Examining a claim
for municipal negligence in inspecting construction of plaintiffs' home
and issuing a building permit,9 the court viewed the municipal
building code to create no duty to any particular resident. 5 Otherwise,
the court concluded, no "special relationship" existed between the
parties," as the municipality made no "specific assurances to the

87. 209 Ga. App. 414, 434 S.E.2d 71 (1993).
88. Id. at 414, 434 S.E.2d at 72. The officer gave chase upon seeing the suspect run
a stop sign until the officer could observe and read to dispatch the suspect's tag number.
The officer then slowed, but the suspect ran another stop sign and collided with decedent.
Id., 434 SE.2d at 71-72.
89. Id. at 416, 434 S.E.2d at 73.
90. Id. The court eschewed both the rule that as a matter of law the pursuing officer's
conduct was not the "proximate cause" of the third party's injury and the approach making
the issue a jury question in every case. Id. at 417, 434 S.E.2d at 73.
91. Id.
92. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 73-74. The court affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment
for the municipality and the police officer. Id. at 417, 434 S.E.2d at 74.
93. 211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
94. Id. at 312, 439 S.E.2d at 97. Because of that negligence, plaintiffs alleged, they had
suffered periodic flooding damages to their home. Id. at 313, 439 S.E.2d at 98.
95. Id. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99. The code "expressly provides that it is to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare of its citizens." Id.
• 96. Id. at 316, 439 S.E.2d at 99. Relying upon the Georgia Supreme Court's decision
in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993), the court said that "liability
attaches to the municipality only where a special relationship exists between the
municipality and the injured individual which sets the individual apart from members of
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[plaintiffs] or promises prior to the inspection and approval of the

home.' 9
The survey period unfolded a novel defense to the traditional
"nuisance" exception to municipal immunity." In City of Thomasville
v. Shank," the municipality argued its nuisance liability to have
suffered termination by the 1990 constitutional amendment eliminating
the insurance waiver provision."
Rejecting that argument,0 1 the
supreme court expressly reaffirmed "the longstanding principle that a
municipality is liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance which
constitutes
either a danger to life and health or a taking of proper02
ty.

1

The court of appeals considered a nuisance complaint in Banks v.
Mayor of Savannah, 3 an action for damages from plaintiff's collision
with a police car.'
Turning a deaf ear, the court explicated the
necessity for"a continuous or regularly repetitious act or condition" and
municipal notice of "the dangerous condition or repetitive acts causing
injury."1102"5 This collision, the court concluded, "was a one-time occurrence."

the general public." 211 Ga. App. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
97. 211 Ga. App. at 315-16, 439 S.E.2d at 99. "As [plaintiffs] did not establish that
a duty of care was owed to them by the city based upon a special relationship, the trial
court erred in failing to grant the city's motion for directed verdict." Id. at 316, 439 S.E.2d
at 99.
98. For treatment of"nuisance" liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW oF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiabilityin Georgia: The 'Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43
MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991).
99. 263 Ga. 624, 437 S.E.2d 306 (1993). Plaintiff sued the municipality for damage
to her home which was flooded with raw sewage. Id. at 624, 437 S.E.2d at 307.
100. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, pars. 9. Later in the survey period, the court would hold
this amendment not to apply to municipalities. See City of Thomaston v. Bridges,
discussed at text accompanying supra note 83.
101. 263 Ga. at 625, 437 S.E.2d at 307-08. "This holding is not in conflict with the
1990 amendment as that amendment deals with the concept of waiver, and in the case of
nuisance we are dealing not with a waiver of but an exception to sovereign immunity."
102. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 307. As for plaintiffs claim, the court affirmed the trial judge's
refusal to take the issue of nuisance from the jury. Id at 626, 437 S.E.2d at 308.
103. 210 Ga. App. 62, 435 S.E.2d 68 (1993).
104. Id. at 62, 435 S.E.2d at 69-70. Plaintiff charged the municipality with inadequate
training of its police officers in operating the cars. Id.
105. Id., 435 S.E.2d at 70. 'The fact that other collisions have occurred with police cars
in [the municipality] does not make each collision part of the maintenance of a nuisance."

I&,
106. Id. "Nuisance can be shown only by acts of appellees, that is, evidence of their
specific failure or specific negligence in training which resulted in the collisions. Plaintiff
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Plaintiffs of the period also sought escape from municipal immunity
via "Section 1983,"1O7 the federal civil rights statute.'ce An apt illustration of the tactic, Bell u. City ofAlbany °9 featured an action by one
arrested while intoxicated and injured while struggling with a police
officer at the booking station."' Searching in vain for the municipal
"policy or custom" prerequisite to the proceeding,"' the court assessed
plaintiff's efforts:
There was no evidence of any official City policy or custom of using
excessive force against arrestees, nor was there any evidence that the
City endorsed a policy or custom of handling intoxicated arrestees in
a manner which resulted in injury. There was no evidence of other
incidences of such conduct suggesting any widespread informal policy
or practice constituting a custom or usage with the force of law."u

affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the
The court thus
3
municipality.1

has not shown this." Id.
The court also rejected a nuisance contention in City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga.
App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993), regarding the periodic flooding of plaintiffs' home. The
court held the evidence to show no municipal control over the drainage system and, at
most, to reveal only insufficient municipal negligence. 211 Ga. App. at 317, 439 S.E.2d at
100.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
108. See generally R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWS
ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984).
109. 210 Ga. App. 371, 436 S.E.2d 87 (1993).
110. Id. at 371, 436 S.E.2d at 89. While the officer was attempting to maneuver
plaintiff through a door, plaintiff suddenly began to struggle, and in the ensuing fall,
plaintiff struck his head. Id at 371-72, 436 S.E.2d at 89.
111. Id. at 372-73,436 S.E.2d at 90. "Municipalities are persons under the statute held
accountable if the deprivation of rights alleged was the result of a municipal policy or
custom." Id. at 372, 436 S.E.2d at 90.
112. Id. at 373, 436 S.E.2d at 90. "Neither was there evidence sufficient to create any
factual issue in support of any claim of inadequate training." Id. To the plaintiffs action
against the officer individually, the court probed the applicable Fourth Amendment
standard and concluded as follows: "We find, as a matter of law, that [the officer's] actions
were an objectively reasonable use of force under the circumstances, and that he is entitled
to the protection of qualified immunity." Id. at 376, 436 S.E.2d at 92 (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. The court afforded short shrift to yet another § 1983 complaint in Banks v.
Mayor of Savannah, 210 Ga. App. 62, 435 S.E.2d 68 (1993). In response to an action for
injuries suffered by plaintiff in a collision with a police car, the court asserted that § 1983
"is not a means to circumvent sovereign immunity in cases involving negligence; it applies
only to acts of a governing body which deprive a citizen of constitutional rights pursuant
to 'an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.'" Id. at 63, 435
S.E.2d at 70 (citing City of Cave Springs v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 5, 310 S.E.2d 892 (1984))..
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Several claimants encountered difficulty with the "ante litem notice"
requirement, the statutory command of written notice of claim to the
municipal governing authority within six months of the event." 4 In
Brown v. City of Chamblee,"' plaintiff alleged a municipal conspiracy
in his citation for electrical code violations.'
Affirming dismissal, the
court could find no evidence that the notice, a "condition precedent" to
the action, had been given." 7 Plaintiff fared no better in City of
LaGrange v. USAA Insurance Co.," an insurer's claim to subrogation
for damages to its insured's house by a ruptured water main." 9 The
only written notice given, the court emphasized, went to the municipality's insurance carrier, and "notice to the City's insurer is not substantial
compliance with the requirement of notice to the governing authority of
the municipality."" ° The court was equally adamant concerning
waiver of notice by a municipal official:' 2 ' "The statutory requirements
for ante litem notice to the governing authority of the city generally may
not be waived by the city or by an individual, even if that individual is
the official directly responsible for the injury or for claims adjustment."12

114. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1993). For discussion, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Georgia Municipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Cause for Pause, URBAN GA. 24 (Oct. 1978).
115. 211 Ga. App. 145, 438 S.E.2d 396 (1993).
116. Id. at 145, 438 S.E.2d at 397.
117. Id. at 148, 438 S.E.2d at 398. "The record contains no such ante litem notice, and
[plaintiff] does not allege the sending of a notice in his complaint or state that he did so
in his affidavit." Id. The court was incredulous over plaintiffs attempt to use the "hazard
notice" issued to him by the city as an ante litem notice: 'This contention is completely
without merit .... It is a notice of a "hazard" directed to [plaintiff], not notice of a "claim"
by [plaintiff]." Id.
118. 211 Ga. App. 19, 438 S.E.2d 137 (1993).
119. Id. at 19, 438 S.E.2d at 138.
120. Id. at 21, 438 S.E.2d at 139. "The insurer is not a 'department' of the City, nor
is it the 'agent' of the 'governing authority of the municipality.' The contract between the
City and its insurer does not convert the insurer to the agent of the City for the purpose
of ante litem notice .... " Id. at 20-21, 438 S.E.2d at 139.
121. Id. at 21, 438 S.E.2d at 139. Plaintiff alleged that an official in the municipal
personnel department has mislead plaintiff in respect to the notice. Id. at 20, 438 S.E.2d
at 138.
122. Id. at 21, 438 S.E.2d at 139. Moreover, the court said, the municipal governing
authority could not be estopped as the result of an ultra vires act of its officer in waiving
the notice. Id. For discussion of the doctrine of estoppel generally in local government law,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESFOPPEL [N GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW (1985).

In yet another case of the period, Maxwell v. City of Chamblee, 212 Ga. App. 135, 441
S.E.2d 257 (1994), the court reversed a summary judgment for the municipality for lack
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An additional, incidental but nevertheless effective, immunity for local
governments is the Recreational Property Act," insulating from
negligence liability owners of public recreational property provided
without charge. 124 Illustratively, Spivey v. City of Baxley' presented a softball game spectator's action for injury from a fall at the citycounty recreational park."2 Affirming summary judgment for defendants, the court found the evidence to show neither wilfulness 27 nor
a charge for plaintiffs entry onto the premises."2 Additionally, the
court extended the statute's coverage beyond those actually involved in
recreational activities and to spectators at athletic events.' 9
Accompanying claims for municipal liability, disgruntled plaintiffs
frequently seek personal accountings from the governmental officers
themselves.13
The petition in Brown v. City of Chamblee" for
example, alleged an official conspiracy against plaintiff in the operation
of his business.' 2 Plaintiff anchored his claim for damages in the
historic statutory mandate of personal liability for "members of the

of notice. Id. at 136-37, 441 S.E.2d at 259. Because there were material issues of fact

present regarding the city's continuing trespass, summary judgment was proper only as
to those trespasses occurring more than four years prior to filing the complaint. Id. at 136,
441 S.E.2d at 259. As to later trespasses, the proper disposition was dismissal. Id. at 13637, 441 S.E.2d at 259.
123. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (1982).
124. Id. § 51-3-23. The statute's purpose is to encourage owners to make their property
available for recreational purposes. Id. § 51-3-20.
125. 210 Ga. App. 772, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993).
126. Id. at 773, 437 S.E.2d at 625. Plaintiff was a minister's wife who was attending
a church softball game at the park. Id. at 772, 437 S.E.2d at 624.
127. Id. at 773, 437 S.E.2d at 625. Plaintiff had stepped into a hole next to a concrete
drainage slab; the court found no evidence that authorities were aware of the danger so as
to come within the "wilfulness" exceptioi 'to the immunity conferred by the statute. Id.
at 773-74, 437 S.E.2d at 626 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-25).
128. 210 Ga. App. at 774, 437 S.E.2d at 626. No fee was charged for spectator
admission, but a fee was charged for individuals and teams participating in the softball
program. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that she had paid an entry fee via her
church contributions. Id.
129. Id. at 775, 437 S.E.2d at 626. Although the statute does not expressly mention
spectators at athletic events, the court held such coverage "not an unwarranted extension"
of its scope. Id.
130. For background on official and personal liability, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia
Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., IndividualLiability in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The HauntingHiatus
of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort
Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405, 423 (1993).
131. 211 Ga. App. 145, 438 S.E.2d 396 (1993).
132. Id. at 145, 438 S.E.2d at 397.
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council and other officers of a municipal corporation." 33 In treating
that claim, the court of appeals sketched plaintiff's charges of a political
"vendetta" resulting in his being cited for an electrical code violation.'3 4 Affirming summary judgment for defendant officers, the court
found no evidence "that the appellees acted contrary to a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty or that they acted with malice." 33 Without such
evidence, the court concluded, the statutory claim could not survive. 6
H.

Zoning
The municipal zoning issues encompassed by OS Advertising Co. of
Georgia v. Rubin' emerged from two primary attacks by an outdoor
sign business against municipal action.s First, plaintiff contested, as
arbitrary and capricious, the municipal board of zoning adjustment's
denial of a variance for a particular sign.'
Under the "any evidence"
standard of review, the supreme court noted findings by "the city's
experts in zoning and planning," and deemed the trial judge possessed
of "adequate evidence" for affirming the board's denial.' 4 Plaintiff's
second attack went to the constitutionality of the municipality's sign
ordinance as it related to other of plaintiff's properties.
On this
issue, the court reversed the trial judge's dismissal for plaintiffs failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.'
Delineating "declaratory

133. Id. at 147, 438 S.E.2d at 398 (citing O.C.GA. § 36-334 (1993)).
134. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 397. Plaintiff alleged improper inspections of his business
premises, resulting invalid charges against him, an improper hazard notice, and illegal
termination of his electrical service. He charged "a vendetta against him because of his
political opposition to the mayor." Id.
135. Id. at 147-48, 438 S.E.2d at 398. For the necessity of such evidence under the
statute, the court relied upon the supreme court's decision in City of Hawkinsville v.
Wilson & Wilson, Inc., 231 Ga. 110, 200 S.E.2d 262 (1973). 211 Ga. App. at 147, 438
S.E.2d at 398.
136. 211 Ga. App. at 147, 438 S.E.2d at 398. "Without more, this disagreement
between [plaintiffi and city officials does not rise to the level required to show liability
under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4." 211 Ga. App. at 147, 438 S.E.2d at 398.
137. 263 Ga. 761, 438 S.E.2d 907 (1994).
138. Id. at 761-62, 438 S.E.2d at 909.
139. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 908. The sign admittedly violated both setback and height
requirements of the municipal ordinance, thus the necessity of a variance. Id.
140. Id. at 762, 438 S.E.2d at 909. Given the municipal power to engage in land use
restrictions, "[t]he courts will not disturb the decisions of local agencies unless they act
beyond the discretionary powers conferred upon it or acted arbitrarily or capriciously
concerning the property owner's constitutional rights." Id.
141. Id. "OS Advertising alleges that the sign ordinance is unconstitutional, with
regard to all the property within its purview." Id. at 763, 438 S.E.2d at 909-10.
.
142. I& at 762, 438 S.E.2d at 909.
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judgment claims in zoning cases,"'" the court held that "there is ...
no exhaustion requirement when... the property owner challenges the
constitutionality of an ordinance on its face." 1'
In another zoning controversy of the period, Board of Zoning
Adjustment of Atlanta v. Murphy,14 the court of appeals considered
whether a variance applicant could "take advantage of [a] previous nonconforming off-site parking situation .... ."" Deciding in the negative,
the court held that the owner of a restaurant, wishing to move to
another building enjoying a nonconforming lack of sixteen parking
spaces, could not employ that nonconformance in seeking a variance.'4 7
Accordingly, the applicant must provide the required forty-two spaces for
the building rather than the twenty-six spaces resulting from a
deduction of the previously excepted sixteen spaces.' 4
II.

COUNTIES

A

Power
The power contest of the survey period featured a standoff between the
two dominant forces of county government: the board of commissioners
and the sheriff. Wayne County v. Herrin'49 constituted the commissioners' challenge to the newly elected sheriff's termination of seventeen

143. Id. The exhaustion requirement did apply, the court emphasized, when the
property owner's claim "arises from [the ordinance's] effect upon a particular parcel of land
because of features unique to that property... ." Id.
144. Id. at 763, 438 S.E.2d at 909 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926)). Additionally, the court rejected the municipal argument that plaintiffs statement
in its application for a variance was insufficient to raise the constitutional question. Id.,
438 S.E.2d at 910. "Although appellant did not name specific code sections, we hold that
the references to the Atlanta Zoning Ordinance were not so vague that the [board of zoning
adjustments] could not understand the nature of the challenge." Id. at 764, 438 S.E.2d at
910.
145. 211 Ga. App. 120, 438 S.E.2d 134 (1993).
146. Id. at 120, 438 S.E.2d at 135.
147. Id. at 121, 438 S.E.2d at 136. The building housed a retail store, requiring 27
parking spaces, but lacked 16 of those spaces as a nonconforming use. Plaintiffs
restaurant in the building would require 42 spaces, and he sought a variance based on
providing only 26 (42 minus 16) spaces, thereby seeking to employ the previous
nonconforming use. Id. at 120, 438 S.E.2d at 135.
148. Id. at 121, 438 S.E.2d at 135. Additionally, the court reversed the board of
adjustment's allowance of off-site parking if plaintiff would provide an attendant at those
locations. The court reasoned that "the record is devoid of evidence as to just how the
parking attendant condition would protect the public interest." Id.
149. 210 Ga. App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793 (1993).
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prior employees of the sheriff's office."W Plaintiffs relied upon civil
service protection of the employees;... the defendant upon the sheriff's
statutory power of appointment. 5 2 The court of appeals approached
the controversy by approving county creation of its personnel system"5
as well as the system's inclusion of all seventeen affected employees.1"
With system in place, the court construed the sheriff's appointment
power as "limited to vacancies created by the removal of employees in
the manner provided under the applicable personnel or civil service
system or vacancies created when employees resign or retire." 55
Accordingly, the court held the terminations violative of county
personnel policies"'5 7and reversed the trial judge's refusal to mandamus reinstatement.
Officers and Employees
No concern looms larger to the prospective county officer than
eligibility for the office. This was the concern of McIntyre v. Miller,'
litigation over an amendment to the constitution rendering convicted
felons ineligible to hold public office for ten years following completion

B.

150. Id. at 747, 437 S.E.2d at 795. The sheriffhad effected the immediate terminations
upon the first day of his tenure and appointed replacements at the same time. The county
had continued to pay the "terminated" employees and refused to pay the replacements. Id.

at 748, 437 S.E.2d at 796.
151. Id. at 748-49, 437 S.E.2d at 796-97. The Georgia Constitution, art. IX, § 1, para.
9, empowers the legislature to authorize county civil service systems, and the Georgia
Legislature, O.C.G-A. § 36-1-21 (1993), has implemented the delegation.
152. 210 Ga. App. at 751,437 S.E.2d at 798 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23 (1990 & Supp.
1994)). The court conceded that "deeply embedded in our case law is the notion that the
sheriff alone has the authority and power to appoint and fire deputies." Id.
153. Id. at 750, 437 S.E.2d at 797. The court rejected the sheriffs contention that the
county's creation of the system was invalid because performed by "motion.' The court said:
"MWe hold the motion creating the current personnel system was a resolution within the
meaning of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21." 210 Ga. App. at 750, 437 S.E.2d at 797. For a review of
this and other facets of the local government legislative process, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
The Legislative Processin GeorgiaLocal Government Law, 5 GA. L. REV. 1 (1970).

154. 210 Ga. App. at 755, 437 S.E.2d at 801. Indeed, the court noted "this case
highlights a problem associated with our legislature's decision not to limit what positions
within an elected official's office could be brought within a civil service system." Id. at 753,
437 S.E.2d at 800.
155. Id. at 753, 437 S.E.2d at 799. The court rejected the commissioners' argument
that the civil service statute could not be reconciled with the sheriffs appointment power.
Id.
156. Id. at 755, 437 S.E.2d at 801; e.g., the requirement that employees could, be
dismissed only for cause.
157. Id. at 755-56, 437 S.E.2d at 801. Additionally, the court reversed the trial judge's
order that the commissioners pay the 17 replacements. Id. at 756, 437 S.E.2d at 801.
1..,
158. 263 Ga. 578, 436 S.E.2d 2 (1993).
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of sentence. 159 That prohibition applied, the supreme court held, even
though plaintiff had completed his sentence prior to the date of the
amendment."6 The court declared plaintiff without "vested rights
which mandate a deviation from the long-standing rule that eligibility
to hold public office is to be determined by the statutory and constitutional requirements in effect on the date of the election."'
Of only slightly less concern than eligibility is the prospect of a
successful election contest. Johnson v. Byrd'62 presented that prospect
to the winner of a runoff election for county probate judge." Transforming prospect to reality, the supreme court found the election
First, the
tarnished by a sufficient number of ineffective votes. 1'
Second,
court declared invalid the votes of eight convicted felons.'
the court likewise invalidated the votes of forty-three individuals listed
as electors but who had failed to sign their registration cards. 166 By
virtue of that failure, the court reasoned, the individuals had taken no
oath and thus "never became lawfully registered voters who were
authorized to cast ballots."' 7
The contestants in Ellis v. Johnson1"8 enjoyed less success in their
efforts to effect recounts for county elections.'6 9 Those efforts rested
upon contestants' stated belief that the tabulating machines had
erred, 7 ' but their admissions of no knowledge of an actual malfuncConcluding that the material statute required allegation and
tion.'

159.

GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 3 (1983 & Supp. 1994).

160. .263 Ga. at 579, 436 S.E.2d at 4. Plaintiff had completed serving his sentence in
1987, and the constitution was amended in 1991. Id. at 578, 436 S.E.2d at 3.
161. Id. at 578, 436 S.E.2d at 4. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument of double
jeopardy: 'he obvious purpose of the instant constitutional amendment is not to impose
an additional penalty upon convicted felons, but merely to designate a reasonable ground
of eligibility for holding public office in this state." Id.
162. 263 Ga. 173, 429 S.E.2d 923 (1993).
163. Id. at 173, 429 S.E.2d at 924.
164. Id. at 175, 429 S.E.2d at 925. The contestee won the election by only 41 votes, and
the court found a total of 51 invalid votes. Id.
165. Id. This was true even though the felons had not been notified of their ineligibility
to vote nor their names removed from the list of electors. Id. at 174, 429 S.E.2d at 924.
166. Id.
167. Id. Justices Sears-Collins and Benham dissented on this point. 263 Ga. at 176-78,
429 S.E.2d at 926-27.
168. 263 Ga. 514, 435 S.E.2d 923 (1993).
169. Id. at 514, 435 S.E.2d at 924. The elections were for sheriff and members of the
county board of education. Id., 435 S.E.2d at 923-24.
170. Id., 435 S.E.2d at 924. The beliefs were based upon expressions ofdisbelief in the
election results by many voters. Id.
171. Id. The contestants admitted "that they did not have any information or
knowledge that the tabulating machine had in fact malfunctioned in any way." Id.
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proof of some cause for the belief of error,172 the7 court held contestants
deficient in carrying their burden for a recount."
7 4 instanced
More drastic than the election context, Gipson v. Bowers"
The plaintiff citizen effected that
the effort at removal from office.'
the removal of a county sheriff.
to
mandamus
effort through an action
Plaintiff charged specified state officers and entities with failure to
perform their official duties by refusing to remove the sheriff from
office.176 Mandamus, however, issues only when the act sought is one
required by law.177 In this case, the court asserted, "[plaintiff] has
cited no authority, nor have we found any, that would support his
contention that the defendants ...

are required by law to seek [the

sheriff's] removal from office." 78
7 9 projected a county sheriff beyond concerns
Finally, In re Smith"
with right to office and into the realm of criminal contempt."c
Essentially, the court of appeals held the sheriff in contempt'"' of an
order which was not filed until after the sheriff had complied with its
terms.' 2 The court emphasized that sheriffs are "officers of the

172. Id. at 515-16, 435 S.E.2d at 925. That statute was O.C.GA- § 21-2-524(aX8)
(1993). The court rejected contestants' contention that this statute was in conflict with
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-524(c) by construing the latter provision "as focusing only on the
contestant's burden with respect to the ultimate fact of whether an error in counting
actually occurred." 263 Ga. at 516, 435 S.E.2d at 925. The court construed the former (and
controlling) statute "to require an underlying factual basis or 'cause' that had led the
contestant to state generally his or her belief in the ultimate fact that an actual error in
counting occurred." Id.
173. 263 Ga. at 516, 435 S.E.2d at 925. Although thus affirming the judgment in favor
of contestees, the court did reverse the trial judge's award of attorney fees. Id. at 516-17,
435 S.E.2d at 925. It was this point upon which Presiding Justice Hunt and Justice
Fletcher dissented. Id. at 517, 435 S.E.2d at 926.
174. 263 Ga. 379, 434 S.E.2d 490 (1993).
175. Id. at 379, 434 S.E.2d at 490.
176. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 491. Plaintiff named as defendants the Governor, the Attorney
General, and the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council. Id.
177. For treatment of mandamus, and its dominant role in local government law, see
R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

(1989).
178. 263 Ga. at 379,434 S.E.2d at 491. The court noted that the Council had authority
only to discipline and revoke certification of police officers, and that the Governor and
Attorney General could act only upon a criminal indictment. Id. The court thus affirmed
the trial judge's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.
179. 211 Ga. App. 493, 439 S.E.2d 725 (1993).
180. Id. at 493, 439 S.E.2d at 726.
181. Id at 498, 439 S.E.2d at 729.
182. Id. The contempt concerned a statement taken by the sherifffrom an inmate, and
kept by the sheriff personally rather than in the inmate's file. The statement was not
turned over to the GBI in compliance with an order signed on February 21, 1992, but not
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court,"" a status broadening their exposure to the judicial contempt
power.'' That power extended, therefore, to an order "which, although
not filed, was reduced to writing and delivered into the hands of sworn
deputies of the officer of the court for service on the sheriff.""s As for
the conviction itself, the court highlighted evidence that the sheriff was
"well aware" of the order's existence's and was "wilful" in its violation. 87
Contracts
County officers sought on two occasions during the survey period to
hold the county to employment contracts. Neither effort succeeded. In
Brennan v. Chatham County Commissioners,ss the commissioners had
executed an agreement appointing plaintiff county attorney for a term
of two years, but later dismissed him short of that term.18 9 Rejecting
plaintiff's action for moneys under the contract,'' the court of appeals
reflected that under both the county's "Enabling Act"191 and under "the
law generally, a county attorney is an appointed public official who
C.

filed until June 19, 1992, the date of the trial judge's hearing on the contempt citation.

The statement had been turned over to the authorities in May, 1992. Id. at 494, 439
S.E.2d at 727.
183. Id. at 495, 439 S.E.2d at 727.
184. Id. "The contempt power of the courts is broader in cases of 'misbehavior of any
of the officers of the courts in their official transactions' pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of
O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4." 211 Ga. App. at 495, 439 S.E.2d at 727.
185. 211 Ga. App. at 496, 439 S.E.2d at 728.
186. Id. at 498, 439 S.E.2d at 729. The court referred to testimony "sufficient to
support a finding that [the sheriff] knew the order required him to release [the inmate's]
statement to the GBI." Id. at 497, 439 S.E.2d at 729.
187. Id. The court found the sheriffs belief that the statement was private was
"insupportable" and his failure to read the actual terms of the order "more than simple
oversight." Id.
188. 209 Ga. App. 177, 433 S.E.2d 597 (1993).
189. Id. at 177, 433 S.E.2d at 598. The contract extended until 1992, and the
commissioners dismissed plaintiff in 1991. On a preliminary point, plaintiff alleged
violation of the Open Meetings Law. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1990 & Supp. 1993). The
court noted the Open Meetings Law's exception for meetings discussing dismissal of
employees, and the inapplicability of a more recent requirement that votes and minutes
of such meetings shall be public. Id. § 50-14-3(6). That requirement "was not in effect at
the times relevant to this litigation." 209 Ga. App. at 178, 433 S.E.2d at 599. For
background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Remembering Recall in Local Government Law, 10
GA. L. REv. 883 (1976).
190. 209 Ga. App. at 178, 433 S.E.2d at 599. Plaintiff claimed a specific amount
"allegedly due pursuant to the agreement with the county." Id. at 177, 433 S.E.2d at 598.
• 191. 1984 Ga. Laws 5050. These were the local statutes applicable to the county.
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serves at the pleasure of the governing body."19 Declaring the contract "void as against public policy,"193 the court observed that plaintiff
"should
have known that it was unenforceable" at the time he drafted
94
it.

1

Harris County v. Penton ' featured a contract via which the commissioners employed plaintiff as county manager "for a period not to
Upon termination without cause some, six
exceed 24 months."' 9
months later, plaintiff sought damages for breach of the contract.'
Rebuffing that action, the court of appeals read the document as follows:
"The term of employment under this contract could not be more than 24
The contract, therefore, "was indefimonths, but it could be less."'
nite and terminable at will."1 ' Accordingly, plaintiff's "employment
as county manager was terminable at will ... and his firing 'without

192.

209 Ga. App. at 178,433 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Madden v. Bellew, 260 Ga. 530,397

S.E.2d 687 (1990)). The court rejected plaintiffs reliance upon the authorization contained
in O.C.GA. § 36-60-13 (1993) to contract for necessary services and the like. 209 Ga. App.
at 178, 433 S.E.2d at 599. The court reasoned that statute to apply to multiyear leases or
lease purchase contracts, and to be inapplicable to the provision of legal services. Id.
193. 209 Ga. App. at 178, 433 S.E.2d at 599. The court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the county should be estopped from claiming the contract to be void: "A governmental
body cannot be estopped from denying the validity of a void agreement." Id. at 179, 433
S.E.2d at 599. For treatment of estoppel in the law of local government, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF EsTO'PPL IN GEORGA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1985).

194. 209 Ga. App. at 179, 433 S.E.2d at 599. The court thus affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the municipality. Id.
195. 211 Ga. App. 498, 439 S.E.2d 729 (1993).
196. Id. at 499, 439 S.E.2d at 730.
197. Id. at 498, 439 S.E.2d at 730. The effective date of the contract was July 3, 1990,
and a successor beard of commissioners refused to reappoint plaintiff on January 3, 1991.
Id.
198. Id. at 500, 439 S.E.2d at 731.
199. Id. The court found it unnecessary to reach the question whether one county
commission could legally have bound its successor by a contract of employment for a
definite period. For treatment of this problem in local government law, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government and ContractsThat Bind,3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Binding Contractsin GeorgiaLocal Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11
GA. ST. B. J. 148 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local
Government Law:

Configurationsof Codification, 24 GA. L. Rgv. 95 (1989); R. Perry

Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in County Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY Gov. 28
(Mar. 1991).
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cause' by the county, through its board of commissioners, is not actionable."
Regulation
In the regulatory sphere, the litigation spotlight fell upon efforts of an
alcoholic beverage licensee to overturn a county ordinance.201 The
ordinance challenged in S.J.T, Inc. v. Richmond County202 prohibited
covered entertainment, attire, and conduct in establishments licensed to
sell or serve alcoholic beverages on the premises, but excepting
mainstream establishments deriving less than twenty percent of their
gross annual income from alcoholic beverages. 3 Noting the ordinance's stated intent to suppress negative secondary effects of nude
dancing, the supreme court reviewed the subjects prohibited and
Of that amendacknowledged coverage by the First Amendment.'
ment's mandated requirements," 5 the court identified the one in
controversy: "whether the ordinance is narrowly drawn to further the
county's interest in preventing the ... negative effects associated with
adult entertainment establishments offering nude dancing and alcohol.' ° As for overbreadth, the court held the ordinance sufficiently
narrow in describing both attire and conduct prohibited and in avoiding
impact on private behavior. 20 7 In respect to vagueness, the court
conceded that the ordinance did not answer every conceivable question,
but held it sufficiently specific "to permit [challengers] to conduct
themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.' ° On the rationale
of the twenty percent gross income exception, the court agreed there was
"nothing magical about the... cut-off" but perceived a rational relation
D.

200. 211 Ga. App. at 500, 439 S.E.2d at 731. Chief Judge Pope wrote the court's
majority opinion. Presiding Judges Beasley and Birdsong dissented. Id. They construed
the contract to be one for a definite term of 24 months and agreed with the trial court's
decision for the county manager. Id. at 500-01, 439 S.E.2d at 731-32.
201. For treatment of other facets of local government liquor licensing, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L.

REV. 1039 (1981).
202.

263 Ga. 267, 430 S.E.2d 726 (1983).

203. Id. at 270, 430 S.E.2d at 729.
204. Id. at 268, 430 S.E.2d at 728.
205. Id. The court lifted those requirements from Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee,
250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982). They went to whether the regulation furthers an
important government interest, whether it is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and

whether incidental suppression is no greater than essential. 263 Ga. at 268, 430 S.E.2d
at 728.

206. 263 Ga. at 268, 430 S.E.2d at 728.
207. Id. at 269, 430 S.E.2d at 728. "The conduct forbidden by the ordinance is
specifically sexual and does not implicate ordinary public behavior." Id
208. Id. at 270, 430 S.E.2d at 729 (footnote omitted).
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between purpose and income level. 2" Accordingly,
the court affirmed
21
the trial judge's decision of constitutionality.
E. Finances
By virtue of J & A Pipeline Co. v. DeKalb County,21 the survey
period was an eventful one for county finances. The case turned upon
the statutory requirement that in contracting for public works, the
county take from the general contractor "a payment bond with good and
sufficient surety ... for the use and protection of all subcontractors
.. 2 Should the bond not be taken "in the manner and form
required," another statute declared the county liable to the subcontractors. 21 3 In J & A Pipeline Co., the court of appeals held that the
statutory liability could arise "if [the county] fails to inquire adequately
into the solvency and sufficiency of the surety where the circumstances
surrounding the transaction make such failure to engage in further
inquiry unreasonable."2 1' Those circumstances existed, the court
further15held, when a surety affidavit contained inadequate asset descrip2
tions.
Granting certiorari,21 the supreme court reasoned that
[the surety's affidavit is taken "in the form" required by [statute] when
it purports, on its face, to be a statement under oath that the surety "is
the fee simple owner of real estate equal in value to the amount of the

209. Id. "While using a cut-off of 21% or of 19% may have been just as effective, some
particular figure must be chosen if alcohol-derived income is to be used as a measure;
otherwise the ordinance would be too vague to enforce." Id.
210. Id. at 272, 430 S.E.2d at 730. Justice Sears-Collins, joined by Presiding Justice
Hunt, dissented, arguing the ordinance to be unconstitutional. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 730-31.
211. 208 Ga. App. 123, 430 S.E.2d 13 (1993), cert. granted.
212. Id. at 124, 430 S.E.2d at 16 (citing O.C.G. § 13-10-1(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp.
1994)).
213. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102 (1993)). Here the contractor failed to pay the
subcontractor for labor and materials provided on the project and the subcontractor sought
recovery from the county. Id. at 123-24, 430 S.E.2d at 15.
214. Id. at 125, 430 S.E.2d at 16.
215. Id. at 126, 430 S.E.2d at 17. "In this case, facts and circumstances rendering the
county's failure to make further inquiry unreasonable could be proved within the
framework of the complaint." Id.
Before this decision was reversed by the supreme court, the court of appeals rendered
similar decisions against the county in two other cases: Atlanta Mechanical, Inc. v. DeKalb
County, 209 Ga. App. 307, 434 S.E.2d 494 (1993); Mayer Electric Supply Co. v. DeKalb
County, 210 Ga. App. 24, 435 S.E.2d 220 (1993).
216. DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
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[bond) over and above any and all hens, encumbrances, and exemption
rights allowed by law." 17

Asset descriptions, the court held, were not required. 18 Accordingly,
if the county takes a payment bond or surety affidavit "which does, on
its face, comport with the statutory requirements, the subcontractors'
and materialmen's direct action remedy will be defeated notwithstanding
the subsequent inefficacy of the bond or the subsequent discovery of the
falsity of the affidavit. 19
A remaining case, NCNB National Bank of Florida v. Charlton

County,' litigated a county's obligation under an agreement to levy
an annual tax upon the failure of a company, for whose benefit bonds
were issued, to pay amounts required by note and loan.22 ' Specifically,
the court held that the bank's acceleration of the -company's debt under
the note and loan did not create a county obligation under the agreement.

2

Accordingly, acceleration resulted in no new county obligation

to levy the annual tax past the twenty-year period in the agreement.2
F

Roads

An important consideration involving county roads goes to the source
from which their improvement must be funded. This consideration
became especially crucial in DeKalb County School District v. DeKaib

217. 263 Ga. at 649, 437 S.E.2d at 331-32.
218. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 332. "There is no express statutory requirement that the
affidavit provide any legal descriptions of the real estate which the surety has otherwise
sworn is owned in fee simple or that the real estate be located in Georgia." Id.
219. Id. at 649-50, 437 S.E.2d at 332. The court thus reversed the court of appeals.
Id. at 652, 437 S.E.2d at 333. The court noted that a later statute, not applicable to this
case, provides that the payment bond "shall be approved as to form and as to the solvency
of the surety by the officer of the... county... who negotiates the contract...." Id. at
650,437 S.E.2d at 332 (emphasis added) (citing O.C.GA. § 13-10-1(f) (1982 & Supp. 1994)).
The court said that whether this statute "is construable as a statutory authorization of a
cause of action against a county within the mandate of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4 must await the
case wherein that issue is properly presented and raised." 263 Ga. at 650-51, 430 S.E.2d
at 332.
220. 263 Ga. 818, 440 S.E.2d 13 (1994).
221. Id. at 818-19, 440 S.E.2d at 14. The agreement had been executed in 1981 in
conjunction with the issuance of the bonds. Id. at 818, 440 S.E.2d at 14.
222. Id. at 820, 440 S.E.2d at 15. The bank contended "that, because the entire debt
has been accelerated, a tax levy obligation arose prior to the 20-year expiration date which
requires the County to continue to levy the tax until such time as all of the principal and
interest due on the bonds is paid in full." Id. at 819, 440 S.E.2d at 15.
223. Id. at 820, 440 S.E.2d at 15. The court held that "the County's obligation arises
anew on an annual basis only after (the company] fails to make the required payments
and, until [the company] fails to pay, the County has no obligation which would extend the
duration of the Agreement beyond its twenty year term." Id.
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County,"' litigation over responsibility for improvements of a road
leading to a new county school."
The supreme court approached the

issue by examining "the synergistic relationship that exists between the
[School] District and the County for providing services to citizens of the
County.""2
That examination revealed "two different spheres" of
operation,2" with the district "functioning principally to enhance the
education of the youth of the County .... .'
Road improvements
would "stray too far" from that function,2 9 the court concluded, and

"may not be paid for with school tax funds."20 Consequently, "the
County should be required to pay for the road improvements." 1
G.

Courts

According to the criminally indicted defendant in Henry v. State, 2
he suffered a violation of equal protection by virtue of the county in
which indicted.'
Because that county had only two terms of court per
year,'
defendant charged, "he may have to wait longer for his trial
than others in circuits with more terms of court per year."235 When
combined with the "speedy trial" procedure, defendant contended, the
two-term allotment operated with unconstitutional results."'
Responding, the supreme court opted for a "rational basis" rather than
"fundamental right" standard of review."
Under that standard,'

224. 263 Ga. 879, 440 S.E.2d 185 (1994).
225. Id. at 879, 440 S.E.2d at 185. The school district purchased the site for building
the school on a county public road, and the widening of the road at an intersection became
necessary. The improvements did not involve the portion of the road adjoining the school
property. Id.
226. Id. at 880, 440 S.E.2d at 186. The court viewed the Georgia Constitution, art.
VIII, § 6, para. 1(b), to limit the purposes for which school tax funds may be expended, but
held the county to possess broad power to tax and spend, art. IX, § 4, para. 1. 263 Ga. at
880, 440 S.E.2d at 186.
227. 263 Ga. at 881, 440 S.E.2d at 186.
228. Id.
229. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 187.
230. Id. at 882, 440 S.E.2d at 187.
231. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 188. The court reversed the trial judge's decision in the case.
Id.
232. 263 Ga. 417, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993).
233. Id. at 417, 434 S.E.2d at 470.
234. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 15-6-3(15.1) (1990 & Supp. 1994)).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 417-18, 434 S.E.2d at 470 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 (1990)). Defendant
had filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to the code section. Id. at 417, 434 S.E.2d at
470.
237. Id. at 418, 434 S.E.2d at 471. The court held that a showing of delay alone is not
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny review. Id.
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the court conceded the possibility that the term classifications "are not
drawn with mathematical nicety, and may in practice result in some
inequality .... ."" Still, "perfection in drawing classifications is not
required,"' and "[tihe legislature has set the minimum number of
terms of court for each county according to the constitutional minimum
of two per year."241 Thus, the court concluded, "the legislation is
rationally related to the government's interest in moving judicial
caseloadS'.and rationing jury pools."2' 2

H. Liability
Claims for liability, levied against counties and agents of counties,
accounted for massive litigation during the period. Those directed
against counties themselves expended much effort in attempting to
circumvent sovereign immunity.2' The effort succeeded in Daniels u.
DecaturCounty,2' an action for plaintiff's injury while a county prison
inmate.2"5 Allowing the county's liability insurance to effect immunity
waiver, the court relied upon the constitutional provision empowering
the legislature to waive the immunity of local governments by law.2'
The legislature had implemented that authority, the court held, by
permitting local governments to waive immunity for motor vehicles by
obtaining liability insurance.2 "

238. Id. The only question was whether the classification bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 419, 434 S.E.2d at 471.
239. Id. at 419, 434 S.E.2d at 471.
240. Id.
241. Id. "Ifthe legislature determines that certain counties need more terms of court
and can handle the additional demands, then it may extend such a benefit to the people
in that county." Id.
242. Id. "Accordingly, appellant has not produced sufficient proof to demonstrate that
O.C.GJA. §§ 17-7-171 and 15-6-3 deny him equal protection of the laws." 263 Ga. at 419,
434 S.E.2d at 471.
243. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government TortLiability:
The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1986); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
244. 212 Ga. App. 378, 441 S.E.2d 790 (1994), cert. granted.
245. Id. at 378, 441 S.E.2d at 790. Plaintiff alleged injury while working on a county
truck which was knocked off its jack when struck by a front-end loader negligently driven
by a-deputy warden. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 790-91.
246. Id. at 380,441 S.E.2d at 790-91 (relying on GA. CoNsT. art. MX, § 2, para. 9). The
court noted that this provision remained despite the 1990 amendment to the Article I
provision. Id.
247. Id. at 379, 441 S.E.2d at 791 (relying on O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1990)).
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"Inverse condemnation" was the alternative of choice in Forsyth
County v. Greer,' an action for county delays in issuing permits and
certificates for development of plaintiffs' subdivision.'
The court of
appeals afforded the tactic a highly summary disposition: Even
"assuming without deciding that the delays in issuing the permits, etc.
...amounted to a temporary regulatory taking, there is no allegation in
the record that such acts were done for a public purpose.' °
Smail v. Douglas County 1 illustrated the "nuisance" attempt to
hurdle immunity."
Plaintiff alleged county notice of some three or
four incidents in which rocks were thrown from a county bridge, prior to
the one resulting in his wife's death.'
Rejecting plaintiff's charge of
a continuing county nuisance, the court denied the existence of the
proper "nuisance" elements.' Those included conduct exceeding mere
negligence, conduct of some duration, and failure to remedy a known
defect.'
As a matter of law, the court held, plaintiff could "prove no
set of facts which would meet the elements of nuisance ...

248. 211 Ga. App. 444, 439 S.E.2d 679 (1993). For background on the "inverse
condemnation" exception to local government.immunity, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE
LAW OF MuNIcPAL TORT LIABILITY iN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988).
249. 211 Ga. App. at 444-45, 439 S.E.2d at 680. Plaintiffs alleged a temporary
regulatory taking of their property. Id. at 445, 439 S.E.2d at 680.
250. Id. at 446,439 S.E.2d at 681 (citing Kelleher v. State of Georgia, 187 Ga. App. 64,
65, 369 S.E.2d 413 (1988)). The court observed that most of the objectionable acts alleged
were done without approval of the commissioners, did not occur as a part of a land use
plan, and were done with bad faith. Id. "Therefore, there is no cause of action for inverse
condemnation." Id. The court reversed the trial judge's refusal to grant the county's
motion to dismiss. Id. at 447, 439 S.E.2d at 682.
251. 210 Ga. App. 830, 437 S.E.2d 824 (1993).
252. For background on the "uisance" exception to local government immunity, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.
J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERcER
L. REv. 1 (1991).
253. 210 Ga. App. at 830, 437 S.E.2d at 825. Third parties dropped a large rock from
the bridge onto plaintiff's vehicle traveling on the highway below. The rock crashed
through the windshield and killed plaintiffs wife. Id.
254. Id. at 831, 437 S.E.2d at 825.
255. Id. at 830-31, 437 S.E.2d at 825.
256. Id. at 831,437 S.E.2d at 825. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the
county. Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that county law enforcement had
a duty to protect its citizens by noting the absence of a "special relationship" as required
by the supreme court in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 28-29, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
See also Feise v. Cherokee County, 209 Ga. App. 733, 434 S.E.2d 551 (1993), where the
court rejected an action against the county for failure to protect a citizen against a
neighbor. Again, the court relied upon City of Rome. 209 Ga. App. at 734, 434 S.E.2d at
551.
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In equally unsuccessful fashion, Brayman v. Deloach" exemplified
the "Section 1983" approach to county liability.'
Plaintiff asserted
county responsibility for a lesbian relation which developed between
plaintiff's minor daughter and an employee of the county recreation
department. 9 Affirming summary judgment for the county, the court
found no evidence of an "'intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy'
as required by the federal statute.'
Indeed, the court emphasized,
plaintiff complained solely of acts by county employees, a vicarious
responsibility not covered by Section 19 8 3 ."s
The court also forcefully foreclosed plaintiff's effort in Departmentof
6 to extract
Transportationv. Price"
immunity waiver from the statute

applying to county roads in the state highway system.263 That statute

simply provided for the Department of Transportation to be "vouched in"

to defend an action against the county.2 4 The statute "simply makes
DOT responsible for the county's liability when the county is liable
'under existing laws.'"
When the county is not liable, the court
declared, "there is nothing which DOT must defend or for which it must
be responsible. .. .
The court operated in similar fashion on the waiver argument in
Burton v. DeKalb County,'" an action for plaintiff's fall in a countyowned building. 2M As an employee working in the building rented by
her employer, plaintiff claimed third-party beneficiary status to sue on
the county's rental agreement to maintain and repair.'
The court

257. 211 Ga. App. 489, 439 S.E.2d 709 (1993).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
For background on Georgia local government
responsibility under § 1983, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAWS ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984).
259. 211 Ga. App. at 490, 439 S.E.2d at 710. Plaintiff alleged that the relationship
followed his daughter's participation in county recreation programs. Id.
260. Id. at 492, 439 S.E.2d at 711 (citations omitted).
261. Id. "Inasmuch as governmental entities cannot be held vicariously liable for the
actions of their employees, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of the county on [plaintiffs] § 1983 claim." Id.
262. 208 Ga. App. 320, 430 S.E.2d 602 (1993).
263. Id. at 321, 430 S.E.2d at 602 (citing O.C.G. § 32-2-6(a) (1991)).
264. Id.
265. Id. "'The statute says nothing about waiving a county's sovereign immunity and
nothing in the statute creates a waiver of a county's immunity.'" Id. (quoting Christian v.
Monroe County, 203 Ga. App. 342, 344, 417 S.E.2d 37 (1992)).
266. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 603. The court thus reversed the trial judge's conclusion of
waiver. Id. at 323, 430 S.E.2d at 604.
267, 209 Ga. App. 638, 434 S.E.2d 82 (1993).
268. Id. at 638, 434 S.E.2d at 83.
269. Id. at 638-39, 434 S.E.2d at 83. In this fashion, plaintiff sought to avail herself
of the constitution's express waiver of sovereign immunity in actions based on written
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rejected that claim, for two reasons.' First, plaintiff's action sounded
in tort not contract;2 ' and second, plaintiff's employment status
intent to make plaintiff a
"without more, does not evince the requisite
2
beneficiary to the [rental] contract."1
Even upon immunity waiver, Adams v. Coweta County s instanced
a newly discovered procedural prerequisite to suing the countyY 4 The
action arose from a truck striking a guardrail on a county bridge,
allegedly resulting from the county's negligence in designing, installing,
maintaining, and repairing the bridge.26 Delineating carefully, the
court held the charge of negligent design to require an expert affidavit.276 Road and bridge design, the court reasoned, require "engineer-

ing services," or "the performance of professional services" encompassed
by the affidavit statute.Y In contrast, the same conclusion was not
forthcoming for installation, repair, and maintenance of the bridge. 27"
As noted, a number of claims sought liability on the part of county

officers or employees. 27' An example was Schmidt v. Adams,' a
wrongful death action against a physician's assistant at the county jail
for negligent diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's wife. 28, Emphasizing that "official- immunity"2s of governmental employees turns upon
contracts, GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9. 209 Ga. App. at 638, 434 S.E.2d at 83.
270. 209 Ga. App. at 639, 434 S.E.2d at 83-84.
271. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 83. "We agree with the trial court that plaintiff's action against
the county for the negligent failure to maintain the building sounded in tort, not contract,
and that, therefore, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity in this case." Id.
272. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 84. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the county.
Id.
273. 208 Ga. App. 334, 430 S.E.2d 599 (1993).
274. Id. at 334-35, 430 S.E:2d at 600. The court held that insurance waiver had
occurred under the 1983 constitutional provision, art. I, § 2, para. 9, and that the 1990
amendment did not apply. 208 Ga. App. at 335, 430 S.E.2d at 600.
275. 208 Ga. App. at 334, 430 S.E.2d at 600.
276. Id. at 336, 430 S.E.2d at 601.
277. Id. The court noted previous decisions under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993), and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim for negligent design. 208 Ga. App. at 336,
430 S.E.2d at 601.
278. 208 Ga. App. at 336, 430 S.E.2d at 601. Those functions "would not necessarily
require the exercise of professional skill and judgment," and the pleadings did not show
that an affidavit was required. Id.
279. For background on local government officer and employee liability, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REv.
747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law:
The Haunting Hiatusof Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REv. 27 (1988).
280. 211 Ga. App. 156, 438 S.E.2d 659 (1993).
281. Id. at 156, 438 S.E.2d at 659.
282. Id. The court relied upon the supreme court's landmark decision in Hennessy v.
Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980). 211 Ga. App. at 156, 438 S.E.2d at 659.
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"discretionary functions," the court examined the nature of defendant's
duties.'
Medical diagnosis and treatment clearly called for decisions
based upon experience and judgment.'
"The acts complained of are
thus 'discretionary' and fall within the scope of [defendant's) official
immunity."285

Adding an extra dimension, Parker v. Wynn' featured an action
against a school teacher for negligent supervision of a classroom. 287
Although the act was undisputedly "discretionary" and performed in his
"official capacity,"' and although the school district possessed no
liability insurance, the teacher was insured under a policy issued to his
professional association. 9 Reasoning that official immunity could not
be waived by the individual,29° the court held the teacher immune to
plaintiff's claim."'
The court followed its Parker decision in Guthrie v. Irons, 2 an
action against a high school principal and teacher for the death of a'
student beaten in a school hallway between classes.' 3 Again the court
held that exclusively private insurance could not waive the defendants'

283. 211 Ga. App. at 156, 438 S.E.2d at 659-60. "[O]fficial immunity is intended to
protect public officials in the honest exercise of their judgment, however erroneous or

misguided that judgment may be." Id. at 156, 438 S.E.2d at 660.
284. Id. at 157, 438 S.E.2d at 660.
285. Id. The court reversed the trial judge and ordered a summary judgment for
defendant. Id. at 158, 438 S.E.2d at 661.
The court reached a similar decision in Gilbert v. Richardson, 611 Ga. App. 795, 440
S.E.2d 684 (1994), cert.granted, an action against a county deputy sheriff who collided with
plaintiff while responding to an emergency call. Holding the effect of the 1990 Georgia
Constitutional amendment, art. I, § 2, para. 9, to render county participation in an
interlocal risk management plan not to constitute waiver by insurance, the court concluded
that the deputy's decision to rush to an emergency amounted to a "discretionary act." 611
Ga. App. at 798, 440 S.E.2d at 687.
286. 211 Ga. App. 78, 438 S.E.2d 147 (1993).
287. Id. at 78, 438 S.E.2d at 148. During the teacher's brief absence from the
classroom, another student hit the plaintiff in the eye with a pecan. Id.
288. Id. at 79, 438 S.E.2d at 148. Thus, the teacher enjoyed official immunity. Id. at
80, 438 S.E.2d at 148.
289. Id. at 79, 438 S.E.2d at 148. The case was controlled by the 1983 provision of the
Georgia Constitution, art. I, § 2, para. 9, effecting waiver of immunity to the extent of
insurance. 211 Ga. App. at 79, 438 S.E.2d at 148.
290. 211 Ga. App. at 79, 438 S.E.2d at 148. The court said that "immunity is vested
in the sovereign, and assertion or waiver of that defense is the original prerogative of the
sovereign, and not the individual." Id.
291. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 149. The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of
defendant. Id. at 80, 438 S.E.2d at 149.
292. 211 Ga. App. 502, 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993).
293. Id. at 502, 439 S.E.2d at 733. Decedent had been beaten and kicked by a fellow
student in a school hallway while classes were changing. Id.
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official immunity.'
Then turning to the nature of defendants' acts,
the court characterized their duties as monitoring, supervising, and
controlling "the movement of large numbers of students during a change
in classes." 5 Those duties "necessarily required the exercise of some
discretion in deciding where their attention should be directed at any
particular moment, and what action might be required."
Both
defendants, the court concluded, "were exercising what amounts to a
policing function analogous to the discretionary activities of police
officers,""97 and "were shielded by official immunity." '
Finally, Long v. Jones s presented a pre-trial detainee's action
against a county sheriff for restraint, via isolation and chains, after
plaintiff had escaped three times during a period of five weeks." In
delineating the appropriate constitutional protections, the court
disallowed plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim: that amendment applies
only to a convicted inmate.31 As to due process, however, the court
reversed summary judgment for the sheriff: ° "A question of fact is
presented as to whether the restraints were punishment, rather than a
reasonable response to legitimate security concerns.' °

294. Id at 504,439 S.E.2d at 734. "Because official immunity is a form of governmental immunity arising from the state's sovereign immunity, it may be waived under the

applicable constitutional provision [art. I, § 2, para. 9 of 1983] only where the state
provides insurance on behalf of its employees." Id.
295. Id. at 506, 439 S.E.2d at 736. The court said that "[t~he determination as to
whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the specific
actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is made on a case by case
basis." Id. at 504, 439 S.E.2d at 735.
296. Id. at 506, 439 S.E.2d at 736.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 507, 439 S.E.2d at 736. "In exercising their professional judgment, the
defendants should not be deterred or intimidated by the constant threat of personal
liability, as long as they act within the scope of their authority, and without wilfulness,
malice or corruption." Id. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for defendants. Id.,
439 S.E.2d at 736-37. Judge Andrews wrote the court's majority opinion. Chief Judge
Pope, with whom Presiding Judge McMurray and Judges Cooper and Blackburn concurred,
dissented. They viewed defendants' negligent acts to have occurred in the performance of
ministerial duties and thus not entitled to official immunity. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 737.
299. 208 Ga. App. 798, 432 S.E.2d 593 (1993).
300. Id. at 798, 432 S.E.2d at 594.
301. Id. at 799, 432 S.E.2d at 595.
Since [plaintiff] was a pre-trial detainee, not a convicted inmate, his claims involve
the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. While due process
prohibits punishment of a pro-trial detainee, a convicted inmate may be punished,
but not in a cruel and unusual manner in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 799, 432 S.E.2d at 595 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)).
302. Id. at 802, 432 S.E.2d at 597.
303. Id.
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I. Zoning
The court of appeals employed Pruitt v. Fulton County'" to make a
point of zoning procedure. Dismissing the appeal of property owners
who challenged county denial of a rezoning request, the court observed
that no application had been filed from the superior court's grant of
summary judgment for the county.'
The court relied upon a 1989
direction from the supreme court that "'all zoning cases appealed either
to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Georgia must hereafter
come by application...."'
The other zoning decision of the period, Dyches v. McCorkle,' 7 went
to whether members of an area planning commission were liable for
damages for the disapproval of plaintiff's preliminary plan for a
subdivision.'
That disapproval rested upon the finding that the
drainage plan for the subdivision did not comply with county regulations.'" Observing the controlling statute to require bad faith and
wilful and wanton misconduct, the court asserted that the defendants
could not be held personally liable for the negligent performance of their
duties. 1 ' Despite plaintiff's charges that defendants bowed to political
interests, the court 311
viewed the evidence as insufficient to support a
finding of bad faith.
J.

Authorities
Both appellate courts examined the issue of sovereign immunity for
county hospital authorities. They reached diametrically opposing
conclusions. In Carter v. Fulton-DeKalb County Hospital Authority,312
304. 210 Ga. App. 873, 437 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
305. Id. at 874,437 S.E.2d at 861-62. "No application having been filed, we are without
jurisdiction to consider this case." Id.
306. Id. at 873-74,437 S.E.2d at 861 (quoting Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259
Ga. 425, 383 S.E.2d 123 (1989)).
307. 212 Ga. App. 209, 441 S.E.2d 518 (1994).
308. 1& at 209, 441 S.E.2d at 519.
309. Id. at 210, 441 S.E.2d at 520.
310. Id. at 215-16, 441 S.E.2d at 523-24 (citing O.C.G. § 51-1-20(a) (1982 & Supp.
1994)). The court noted that the statute did not distinguish between ministerial and
discretionary functions. Id. at 215, 441 S.E.2d at 523.
311. Id. at 216, 441 S.E.2d at 524. The court was not persuaded by plaintiffs charge
of different treatment for different applicants, and emphasized that there was conflicting
expert evidence on whether applicant met applicable requirements. "The record is devoid
of conduct that would lift the [planning commission] members' shield of immunity." Id. at
217, 441 S.E.2d at 524.
312. 209 Ga. App. 384, 433 S.E.2d 433 (1993). Plaintiffs alleged defendant's negligent
treatment and transport of their decedent. Id at 384, 433 S.E.2d at 434.
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the court of appeals reiterated its previously announced conclusion of
immunity.313 The court observed
that the supreme court had declined
3 14
to review that earlier decision.
Later in the period, in Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke
County, 15 the supreme court reviewed with a vengeance.3 16 The

court initiated that review by locating the following language of the
constitution: "Sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its
departments and agencies. 317 That language, the court announced,
simply did not apply to hospital authorities: "[Hiospital authorities,
because they are neither the state nor a department or agency of the
state, are not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity."'
Although an "instrumentality of government," and performing"essentially governmental functions," the authority "is not only not the state or a

part of the state, it is also not the county or a part of the county."3 19
The court thus320reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for
the authority.
The supreme court's exercise in Thomas may, but does not necessarily,
impact upon yet another earlier decision by the court of appeals. In
HospitalAuthority of Clarke County v. Martin,2 1 it was clear that the

authority's insurance had waived its immunity; but did that insurance

313. Id. at 387, 433 S.E.2d at 436. See Hospital Auth. of Fulton County v. Litterilla,
199 Ga. App. 345, 404 S.E.2d 796 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d
718 (1992). There the court effected a retroactive application of the supreme court's
decision in Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989), that the language
"sue and be sued" in an entity's charter or enabling statute does not waive sovereign
immunity. 259 Ga. at 80, 377 S.E.2d at 676. For extensive treatment of Self, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., "Sue and Be Sued' in Georgia Local Government Law: A Vignette of
Vicissitudes, 41 MERcER L. REv. 13 (1989).
314. See 209 Ga. App. at 397, 433 S.E.2d at 436. Litterilla v. Hospital Auth. of Fulton
County, 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992). There the court held that a liability trust fund
constituted insurance which waived the authority's immunity. Id. at 36,413 S.E.2d at 720.
315. 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
316. Id. at 40, 440 S.E.2d at 195. Plaintiffs action was for a fall on the authority's
premises. Id.
317. Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9).
318. Id. at 41, 440 S.E.2d at 196. "Further, it is irrelevant that the hospital authority
is an instrumentality created by a department or agency of the state, i.e., the county." Id.
at 42, 440 S.E.2d at 196.
319. Id. at 42, 440 S.E.2d at 196. As for "policy considerations," the court emphasized
that the hospital authority is in "direct competition" with private enterprise, and that its
ability to provide itself with insurance rendered inapplicable the concern for protecting the
public purse. Id. at 43, 440 S.E.2d at 197.
320. Id. at 44, 440 S.E.2d at 198. Justice Hunstein concurred only in the judgment,
and Justice Fletcher dissented. Id.'
321. 210 Ga. App. 893, 438 S.E.2d 103 (1993), cert. granted.

1994]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

397

also entail liability for punitive damages?" In response, the court
first declared "Georgia public policy" is opposed to an award of punitive
damages against a hospital authority." Because that policy did not
rest exclusively upon a concern for the public purse, the court reasoned,
it did not bow to the presence of insurance.' 2 "Ifthe Hospital Authority has insurance which would cover an award of punitive damages,...
[ilt simply means the Authority has purchased insurance it does not
3
need.0am
II. LEGISLATION
Space limitations render impossible a discussion of 1994 legislation
affecting local governments. A few measures (all general statutes) might
simply be mentioned.
Municipal boundaries may change by virtue of an enactment
empowering municipalities to de-annex property simply upon the
The terms of members on boards of
application of its owner. 28'

322. Id. at 893, 438 S.E.2d at 104. It was clear that the case was controlled by the
1983 provision of the constitution and that the authority had procured insurance. Id.
323. Id. at 894, 438 S.E.2d at 105. The court noted prior indications by the supreme
court that hospital authorities fell within the policy disallowing punitive damages against
governmental entities. Id. at 893-94,438 S.E.2d at 104-05. Accordingly, "we conclude that
I.. it is against Georgia public policy to allow an award of punitive damages against a
hospital authority created as a governmental entity under the Hospital Authorities Act."
Id. at 894, 438 S.E.2d at 105.
324. Id. at 894, 438 S.E.2d at 105. The court said that "an award of punitive damages
in this context makes no sense because it will not deter the wrongdoing public official
regardless of whether the award is paid out of government coffers or from insurance
purchased by the government." Id. at 895, 438 S.E.2d at 105.
325. Id. at 895, 438 S.E.2d at 105. Judge Andrews wrote the majority opinion for six
judges. Chief Judge Pope, with whom Presiding Judge Beasley and Judge Cooper joined,
dissented on grounds that "when... taxpayers are not forced to pay for the consequences
of official misconduct, public policy considerations should not bar a plaintifffrom being able
to recover an award of punitive damages." Id. at 897, 438 S.E.2d at 107.
In Matthews v. DeKalb County Hospital Auth., 211 Ga. App. 858, 440 S.E.2d 743 (1994),
the court held that one who waited for four hours in the emergency room, left without
seeing a doctor, and died two days later, had severed any causal relation between her
death and the defendant's act of classifying her in a non-life-threatening condition. Id. at
858, 440 S.E.2d at 745.
Finally, in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 434 S.E.2d
450 (1993), the supreme court refused to apply the collateral source rule in an employee's
action against a county transit authority for wrongful termination. Id. at 408, 434 S.E.2d
at 452. As distinguished from tort cases, the court held, 'the collateral source rule is not
applicable in contract cases because collateral source evidence can be admitted if it is
relevant to demonstrate the extent of the plaintiffs actual loss that was caused by the
breach." Id. at 408, 434 S.E.2d at 452.
326. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-22 (Supp. 1994).
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Downtown Development Authorities were reduced from six to four
years. 32 Legislation created a "Council of Municipal Court Judges,"
with an executive committee composed of two representatives from each
judicial administrative district, with the purpose of improving the
municipal court system." s
Of considerable importance to counties, a measure repealed such civil
duties of county grand juries as inspections of public records, finds, and
property, with the requirement, however, that the county jail must be
inspected at 29least once annually and certain county offices once every
three years.$
Another enactment requires county governing authorities to make
appointments to the Department of Family and Children Services, and
declares state and local elected officials ineligible for service as board
members.330
When a county intends to abandon a county road, it must now publish
its intent for a period of two weeks and hold a public hearing on the
matter.ss
Two measures focused upon political influence in local government.
One enactment limits to $1,000 contributions for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of a city or county referendum. 2 Other
legislation supplemented the definition of "Lobbyist" by including
persons who, for compensation, seek to influence the passage or defeat
of ordinances or resolutions, and by requiring their registration and
financial disclosure.'
A requirement of signal importance is that mandating renegotiation
by local governments of local option sales tax distributions following
each United States Census.'
Specified factors for consideration
include population served during business hours and special events; the
"inherent value" of unincorporated areas; service delivery responsibilities; debt obligations; intergovernmental contracts; and joint services
plans.'
Failure to reach a renegotiated agreement will result in
mediation or non-binding arbitration.' 6

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. § 36-42-4 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
Id. § 36-32-40 (Supp. 1994).
Ga. H.R. Bill 1190, Reg. Sess. (1994).
O.C.GA. § 49-3-2 (1994).
Id. § 32-7-2 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Ga. H.R. Bill 1199, Reg. Sess. (1994).

333. O.C.GA. § 21-5-70 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
334. Id. § 48-8-89 (1982 & Supp. 1994).

335. Id.
336. Id.
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Another requirement goes to voting procedures. All cities maintaining
their own voter registration lists must transfer those lists to the county
board of registrars. 7 In turn, the county board must provide cities
with a voter registration list at least fourteen days prior to a municipal
election.'"
A new prohibition bars local governments from refusing to supply
water to residential property, to which water has been furnished through
a separate water meter, because of previous water service debts of a
prior owner." 9 Local governments may not impose a lien against real
property to secure unpaid charges for water unless the property owner
is the one who incurred the charges.'
Local governments are to
maintain records of identifying information on the user of water service
and seek to
recover unpaid charges from the person who incurred the
1
charges.3

Local government power enhancements include a clarification of the
right to accept and spend Community Development Block Grant funds,
and validates previous expenditures of the funds. 42 Local governments are empowered to use outstanding tax liens and existing special
assessment tax liens as a credit to offset payments made to an owner of
vacant or abandoned property.'
Local governments gained new powers in combatting soil erosion.3 4
If certified, they may issue stop work orders and require corrective
action when permit holders commit violations; they may impose
penalties in municipal courts; they may enact ordinances exceeding
minimum legal requirements; and they may require permit applicants
to post bonds.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

If an impetus for improvement is attention, the cause of Georgia local
government law stands to benefit immeasurably from the developments
chronicled here. For again this year, the account reflects, the law of
local government was the law of public preoccupation.

337. Ga. H.R. Bill 1429, Reg. Sess. (1994).
338. Id.
339. O.C.GA. § 36-60-17 (Supp. 1994).

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. § 36-87-2 (1993 & Supp. 1994).

343. Id. § 36-61-9.
344. Id. §§ 12-7-6 to -8, -15 (1992 & Supp. 1994).

345. Id.

